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vented him from establishing the 'new science' as a viable tradition in Cambridge" (p. 72). This
is, I think, an unjustifiable view of the history ofbotany. In choosing to discuss the development
of whole-plant science, Walters has impoverished his subject - the shaping of Cambridge
botany - so that the title ofhis book is a misnomer. Walters describes Henslow as a precursor of
the "New Botany", a title properly reserved for the qualitatively different subject which paid
attention to plant physiQlogy and plant chemical physiology (in the work of Francis Darwin,
Sidney Vines, and Joseph Reynolds Green). As J. D. Hooker wrote in 1884, "Botany is no
longer a knowledge of plants but .. . what they do! You begin with yeasts, moulds, etc., and the
higher you go the less you know ofthe wholeplant and the more of their inwards" [my italics].'
Henslow's teaching and papers are of a different sta^mp from those of his contemporary Arthur
Henfrey (1819-1859), of whom Von Mohl wrote that he was "the first representative of
physiological botany in England".2
Walters is, to be fair, aware of his neglect of the development of cellular approaches to plant-
life. In pursuing one set of aims, it is unfair to be chided for not having considered some other.
Perhaps, but at least that set of aims should provide one with a historically satisfying account.
Taking Harry Marshall Ward, Professor of Botany after Babington, for example, Walters is
forced by his approach to emphasize his whole-plant work, which in fact represented only a
small fraction of his efforts, which were mainly in mycology and bacteriology. In the 1870s,
Cambridge botanists uprooted the whole plant - it is debatable whether it ever recovered. One
is left with the feeling that, in his deep concern for such studies, Walters has been forced to do
some repotting in shallow historical soil.
'L. Huxley, Life andletters ofSirJ. D. Hooker, 2vols., London, Murray, 1918, vol. 1, pp. 403-404.
2On the difference in botany before and after 1860, see, for example, my paper 'The development of
biochemistry in England through botany and the brewing industry', Hist. Phil. Life Sciences, 1980, 2:
141-166.
Neil Morgan
Wellcome Institute
GEORGE CORNER, The seven ages ofa medical scientist. An autobiography, Philadelphia,
University ofPennsylvania Press, 1981, 8vo, pp. x, 41 1, [no price stated].
George Corner died in September 1981 at the age of ninety-one. His autobiography, The
seven ages of a medical scientist, tells the story of a brilliant career, and at the same time
provides a picture of an academic world which contrasts sharply in its urbanity and grace with
the vibrant and aggressive one that many are inclined to associate with the United States of
today.
Corner, whose ancestors had emigrated from England to Maryland in the eighteenth century,
was brought up in comfortable circumstances and qualified in medicine at Johns Hopkins in
1913. He then embarked on a career of teaching and research. The book describes his steady
progress in a series of anatomical posts from Johns Hopkins, where the famous embryologist
Franklin Mall was his mentor; to Berkeley, where he was an associate of Herbert M. Evans;
and then to the new Medical School at Rochester, where for seventeen years he was head ofthe
Anatomy Department. He then returned to Baltimore as Director of the Department of
Embryology in the Carnegie Institution of Washington. Corner did pioneer research work in
the field of reproductive physiology, and the studies which led to the association of his name,
together with that ofWillard Allen, with thediscovery ofthe hormone ofthe corpus luteum, are
faithfully described.
After retiring at the age of sixty from his Baltimore post, Corner spent five years at the
Rockefeller Institute pursuing his other passion - medical history. He then moved to
Philadelphia as Executive Officer of the American Philosophical Society, the most ancient and
in many ways prestigious of America's learned institutions. Here he remained almost to the end
ofhis life - one ofwhose richness he writes with charm in what has proved to be the last ofmany
books ofwhich he was the author.
Although the autobiography came out posthumously, George Corner waited to die long
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enough to correct the proofs and to inscribe presentation cards for the author's copies which he
instructed his publisher to send to his friends, among whom I was always proud to be counted.
Solly Zuckerman
RONALD L. NUMBERS and JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT (editors), Wisconsin medicine.
Historical perspectives, Madison and London, University ofWisconsin Press, 1981, 8vo, pp.
xi, 212, illus., $18.50.
This is a collection of eleven papers delivered at a bicentennial symposium in 1976.
Wisconsin, a State only since 1848, deserved such a study because it was not only typical for the
Mid-west, but a medical pioneer in many respects. Early medicine was, of course, rural and
dominated by malaria. Around 1900, the horse-and-buggy doctor began to be replaced by the
telephone-and-automobile doctor. Progress in surgery made practice shift towards hospitals,
and group practice began in 1916. The health problems of the cities were overcome by 1920. All
this and the subjects of medical sects, societies, and education are discussed in the eleven con-
tributions. The book is very well produced: use of sources, style, editing, bibliographies, index,
and illustrations. It is primarily a social history ofWisconsin medicine. This is not surprising, as
among the eleven authors is only one M.D. (six are graduate students); and impersonal social
history of medicine is fashionable. As I wrote one of the first monographs in the social history
ofmedicine fifty years ago, may I be allowed to plead for the rediscovery of the medical history
ofmedicine? It exists too.
Erwin H. Ackerknecht
Zurich
UFFE J. JENSEN and ROM HARRE (editors), The philosophy of evolution, Brighton,
Harvester Press, 1981, 8vo, pp. vii, 299, £22.50;.
Darwinism has been with us for over 120 years, and other forms ofevolutionism outstrip that
period. Ever since Darwin dispatched his Origin to John Murray, philosophers have speculated
about the range of phenomena which might be understood via an evolutionary perspective. Is
there some kind of analogue of Darwinian evolution by natural selection controlling social
change, for example? And, if so, then what are the analogues of mutation and selection? At a
more abstract level, it is tempting to suppose that changes over time in the corpus of scientific
knowledge (or belief) - changes like those involved in going from Copernicus to Kepler and
from Newton to Einstein - constitute a definite evolution towards higher levels not of fitness,
but of truth. Staying closer to Darwin, the philosopher sees that the basic model itself is not
unproblematical - that there are all sorts of difficulties surrounding the meaning of "natural
selection" and the question ofwhat are the very units ofselection. In other words, evolution pre-
sents philosophical issues at a variety of levels, and it is the merit ofthis book, based upon the
contributions to an Aarhus symposium, that it tackles all the levels.
The number ofessays (fifteen) and their diversity present a problem for the reviewer, but it is
worth mentioning the essay by David Hull on the units of evolution, which is timely given
Gould's recent reintroduction of the notion of species selection into evolutionary theory. Also
notable is Harr6's essay on the evolutionary analogy in social explanation, wherein he argues
that the social analogues of genes are social rules. He concludes that despite the pitfalls facing
anyone overlooking disanalogies between the social and the biological case, the use of the
mutation/selection model is ofvalue insofar as it allows the construction ofexplanations in the
social sphere which do not entail a positive causality between the environment and practices
adapted to it.
For the "pure" philosopher, the final section is the most exciting, comprising an essay by J.
Mittelstrasse, followed by a debate between Laurens Laudan and Bill Newton-Smith on the
thorny issue ofwhether, and, ifso, in what way, scientific change may be regarded as taking us
from a lesser to a greater truth. Laudan offers a "refutation ofconvergent realism" intended to
show that it is better to see science as progressing by maximizing its problem-solving capacity
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